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Abstract
The theory of functionalism holds that mental states are consti-
tuted solely by the functional organisation of an implementing
system. We propose that the specific mechanism supporting
both intelligence and consciousness is data compression. Re-
cent approaches to cognition and artificial intelligence, based
on a branch of theoretical computer science known as algorith-
mic information theory (AIT), have proposed a computational
view of induction, prediction, understanding and conscious-
ness which is founded on this concept. Building on existing
literature we propose the term ‘compressionism’ as a label to
unite theories which recognise intelligent, cognisant systems
as sophisticated data compressors. We show how data com-
pression can shed light on information binding and offer a
novel perspective on the hard problem of consciousness.
Keywords: Consciousness, data compression, artificial intel-
ligence, integrated information, combination problem.
Introduction
Throughout history people have speculated whether the hu-
man mind might be viewed as a sophisticated automaton.
The theory of functionalism holds that mental states are con-
stituted solely by their functional role (e.g. Putnam, 1960).
From this perspective it doesn’t matter how a given system is
implemented functionally, whether it uses electronic circuits
or mechanical gears. What matters when attributing intelli-
gence and cognisance is solely the computational processes
being implemented, a stance which opens the door for con-
sciousness to be realised in many different forms.
While functionalism tells us that intelligence and con-
sciousness may be implemented in a number of ways, it does
not bring us any closer to understanding the specific form of
information processing that gives rise to these phenomena.
Here, we explore the idea that the key function of the brain
which supports both intelligence and consciousness is data
compression. In the following sections we elucidate the na-
ture of data compression and bring together existing theories
which has highlighted its connection with intelligent thought
and subjective experience.
Data Compression
At first blush the concept ‘data compression’ might seem es-
oteric, a niche idea related to information storage in computer
science. However, the concept runs much deeper. Data com-
pression occurs when information is bound together through
the identification of shared patterns. For example the se-
quence 4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 18, 20, 24... can be simplified as
the description “odd prime numbers +1”. The latter repre-
sentation is shorter, hence we can say that it has been ‘com-
pressed’. The elegance and concision of this representation
suggests that it is the true underlying pattern which governs
the sequence. Accordingly, someone who manages to iden-
tify this pattern might claim to have understood the sequence,
because they appreciate its relationship with the causal mech-
anism that produced it.
The above example highlights the close link between data
compression and prediction. As per Occam’s razor, concise
models make fewer assumptions and are thus more likely to
be correct. Levin’s (1974) Coding Theorem demonstrates
that, with high probability, the most likely model that explains
a set of observations is the most compressed one. In addition,
for any predictable sequence of data, the optimal prediction
of the next item converges quickly with the prediction made
by the model which has the simplest description (Solomonoff,
1964). All successful predictive systems, including machines
and humans, are approximations of an ideal data compressor.
Because of its connection to prediction, data compression
can be viewed as providing reliable proof of understanding.
According to Chaitin (2006), “A useful theory is a compres-
sion of the data; compression is comprehension” (p. 77). The
more compression is achieved, the greater the extent to which
a system can be said to understand a set of data. Based on this
principle, an enhanced version of the Turing test for machine
intelligence has been established in which the challenge is to
compress, to the greatest extent possible, 100 megabytes of
textual information drawn from Wikipedia (see Hutter prize;
Legg & Hutter, 2007). While people are very good at iden-
tifying patterns that link words and sentences together, com-
puter programs struggle to identify the underlying meaning
of the text and hence require longer descriptions to encode it.
Shannon (1951) carried out experiments with human par-
ticipants to establish the entropy of English. He presented
masked text and asked participants to guess the subsequent
294
character, finding that, on average, each one required roughly
two guesses (an entropy of 1 bit per character). For a com-
puter program to match this rate of compression it would
have to make predictions as accurately as humans, meaning
it would need to identify the same deep patterns embedded in
the text, which relate to real world structures and concepts.
This form of deep understanding is what we refer to as appre-
ciating the ‘meaning’ of the text.
Take a simple drawing as another example. Without back-
ground knowledge and prior embodied experience, a com-
puter program cannot associate the drawing with previously
experienced objects. To encode the image it must individually
register every pixel on the screen, resulting in a large data file,
even when compression algorithms are applied. However, a
human can recognise an even more complex pattern: for ex-
ample, a drawing of a house. The pixels are not coloured
randomly. Instead there is a clear pattern that explains their
ordering and relations, e.g. the presence of a roof, windows
and a door. These regularities can be summarised concisely
without having to spell them out pixel by pixel.
The greater the extent of the identified patterns, the shorter
the resulting representation and the better predictions it sup-
ports. Imagine that pixel (254, 56) is corrupted by noise. The
uncompressed representation that stores each pixel individ-
ually cannot correct this error. However, if we can identify
patterns in the data, we understand how it is connected. By
appreciating this redundancy we can repair and filter errors.
For instance, we realise that pixel (254, 56) is part of the roof
of the house and thus should be coloured in the same way.
A weakness of the Turing test (Turing, 1950) is that a pro-
gram might pass the test simply by exploiting weaknesses in
human psychology. If a given system passes the test we can-
not be sure if it was because of the quality of the responses
or the gullibility of the judge. In contrast, Hutter’s compres-
sion test is more reliable. The more that data is compressed,
the harder it becomes to compress it further (Chaitin, 2006).
Because there is no way to cheat by using a simple heuris-
tic, data compression presents a reliably hard standard. We
argue that this process of identifying deep patterns through
compression is what people mean when they attribute both
‘intelligence’ and ‘consciousness’.
Compression and Intelligence
Research in the area of artificial intelligence and cognitive
science is increasingly identifying data compression as a key
organisational principle. Wolff (1993) originally identified a
link between computing, cognition and information compres-
sion. He developed the idea that the storage and processing
of information in computers and brains, from the recognition
of objects to the use of natural language, can be understood
in terms of information compression. Chater and Vitya´nyi
(2003) have proposed data compression as a unifying princi-
ple in cognitive science. They point out that much of percep-
tion, learning and high-level cognition involves finding ‘sen-
sible’ patterns in data. It is the simplicity, or concision, of
these patterns which supports their predictive power.
Schmidhuber (2009) proposes data compression as the
simple principle which explains essential aspects of subjec-
tive beauty, novelty, surprise, interestingness, attention, cu-
riosity, creativity, art, science, music and jokes. He argues
that data becomes temporarily interesting once an observer
learns to predict (i.e. compress) it in a better way, making it
subjectively simpler and more ‘beautiful’. From this perspec-
tive, curiosity can be viewed as the desire to create and dis-
cover patterns that allow for compression progress, with the
level of interestingness being related to the effort required.
According to Schmidhuber, this drive for compression moti-
vates exploring infants, mathematicians, composers, artists,
dancers and comedians, as well as artificial systems.
In a similar vein, both Maguire et al.’s (2013) theory of
subjective information and Dessalles’ (2011) simplicity the-
ory view data compression as a key explanative construct in
the phenomenon of surprise. When people experience a stim-
ulus which is expected to be random, yet is found to be com-
pressible, it triggers a surprise response. Observations of this
form suggest the existence of an underlying pattern where
none was anticipated, resulting in an urgent representational
updating process. Accordingly, Maguire et al. (2013) suggest
that people often rely on data compression rather than proba-
bility theory to judge likelihood and make decisions in many
real world scenarios.
Adopting the perspective of the mind as a compressor,
Gauvrit, Zenil and Tegne´r (2015) connect AIT to experimen-
tal observations in the areas of working memory, probabilistic
reasoning and linguistic structures. They argue that the con-
cepts of data compression and algorithmic complexity pro-
vide an important normative tool which can shed light on a
broad range of cognitive processes, from language use to the
interpretation of EEG and fMRI data (e.g. Wang et al., 2014).
In the field of AI, Hutter (2005) views data compression as
the key to an ideal mathematical definition of intelligence. He
defines intelligence in terms of an agent’s ability to achieve
goals and succeed in a wide range of environments, a capacity
which depends on being able to identify the simplest model
which explains a set of data. Hutter’s parameterless theory
of universal artificial intelligence, known as AIXI, relies on
the most compressed model to predict the future and guide its
decisions.
The connection between compression and prediction can
provide an elegant explanation for why the brain has evolved
to carry out compression so effectively. In order to thrive in
an uncertain environment, organisms must be able to antic-
ipate future events. The more efficiently they can compress
their experiences, the more accurate their predictions will be.
As a result, organisms have evolved brains which are prodi-
gious compressors of information: compressing sensory in-
formation provides them with an understanding of their en-
vironment. We propose the term ‘compressionism’ to group
together those theories which view data compression as the
key organisational principle underlying the structure of intel-
ligent thought. In the following sections we make the case
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that, as well as providing a grounding for a formal definition
of intelligence, compressionism also provides the foundations
for a philosophy of mind which can shed light on the combi-
nation problem and offer insight into the nature of subjective
experience.
The Combination Problem
Intuitively, our subjective experience seems to carry the qual-
itative characteristic of being united and singular, a property
which is at odds with the reducibility of the physical world.
How can the brain, whose processing is clearly distributed in
space and time, give rise to a consistently integrated perspec-
tive? James (1890) vividly articulated this problem: “Take a
sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to
each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in
a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will;
nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence”
(p. 160).
Here James is highlighting the apparent incoherence of a
collection of physical objects sharing a combined experience.
We propose that combination is achieved, not by any local
physical convergence or supernatural process, but through the
process of data compression. When the brain compresses in-
formation, it is binding data together through the identifica-
tion of shared patterns that might originally have been dis-
persed in space and time. The process of grouping and encod-
ing these patterns yields computational results which reflect
a ‘coming together’ of information. We will now explore the
idea that this combination effect might be what underlies the
united characteristic of conscious behaviour.
United Through Cooperation
The reproductive success of an organism is dependent on co-
operation between all of its constituent components, leading
to a form of compression which unites data distributed across
space and time. For instance, it does not make sense for an
organism’s legs to maintain independent agenda. Because the
interests of both legs are intimately bound, it is more pro-
ductive for them to cooperate with each other in achieving a
single set of objectives (e.g. walking). Accordingly, the brain
sources sensory information from all over the body and binds
it through compression, thereby optimising predictive accu-
racy for the organism as a whole. Tactile information from
every limb is compressed alongside visual information from
the eyes and audio information from the ears, giving rise to
a form of understanding that is centralised and representative
of the organism’s experiences as a singular unit. The result-
ing decisions of the organism also appear centralised: to the
external observer it seems as if the organism’s body is being
‘controlled’ by a single entity.
The success of an organism also depends on cooperation
through time. Accordingly, the response it exhibits to a sen-
sory stimulus depends not just on its immediate processing,
but also on its memories. Patterns in a current stimulus
are matched against patterns distilled from historical stim-
uli, leading to a form of understanding that unites not only
distributed sensory organs but also an organism’s past and
present states (see Maguire & Maguire, 2010).
The more memories we store, the greater our ability to
identify and compress patterns in novel stimuli. For instance,
when we observe an apple we can connect the sensory data
with a large number of previously encountered apples, allow-
ing us describe the stimulus concisely in terms of its rela-
tionship to an existing set of memories. Rather than needing
to encode every detail of the fruit, we can simply note the
ways in which it differs from a historical prototype, allowing
greater redundancy to be identified, and thus enhancing pre-
dictive accuracy. In this way, data compression can support
the identification of concepts.
Intuitively, features of the brain which are not linked to op-
timising behaviour should not have been rigorously preserved
by evolution. The question thus arises of why the brain should
go to the effort of producing consciousness at all. One advan-
tage of the ‘compressionist’ perspective is that, rather than re-
quiring an additional unique property of the brain to answer
this question, it simply extends an approach which is already
used to model intelligence. Given that it manages to link uni-
tary processing to predictive and reproductive success, com-
pressionism can provide an elegant explanation for why and
how the brain has evolved to bind information.
Integrated Information Theory
The above account of binding through data compression bears
close resemblance to Tononi’s (2008) integrated information
theory. In line with compressionism, Tononi proposes that
consciousness is an information processing phenomenon and
can thus be quantified in terms of a system’s organisational
structure, specifically its capacity to integrate information.
Tononi provides two thought experiments highlighting the
need for conscious observations to a) produce information,
and b) integrate information. In the first thought experiment
he considers the difference between a human and a photo-
diode viewing a screen. The photodiode can only respond
with two outputs, either light or dark. Accordingly, it gener-
ates a single bit of information about the stimulus, whereas
a person, being able to distinguish between millions of dif-
ferent images, generates a much greater quantity of informa-
tion. According to Tononi, the ability to discriminate between
many different alternatives is an essential ingredient to con-
scious experience.
In his second thought experiment, Tononi (2008) estab-
lishes that information must be integrated to produce con-
sciousness. He considers a digital camera whose sensor chip
is a collection of a million binary photodiodes. Taken as a
whole, the camera can distinguish among 21,000,000 alterna-
tive states, corresponding to 1 million bits of information.
With this level of precision, the camera is capable of respond-
ing differently to every frame from every movie that has ever
been produced. However, because the information is not inte-
grated, it’s still not conscious. The photodiodes have no way
to interact, and thus the camera is no different to a collec-
tion of a million independent photodiodes. If we chopped it
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up into a million pieces, each containing a photodiode, the
function of the camera would not change at all.
Tononi (2008) seeks to quantify integration as the amount
of information generated by a system as a whole above and
beyond the information generated independently by its parts.
For integrated information to be high, a system must be con-
nected in such a way that information is generated by causal
interactions among, rather than within, its parts, making it
difficult to decompose into informationally disjoint parts. For
example, people do not consider a digital camera to be con-
scious because, although it records information, each piece of
data is processed independently and thus easily separated. It
is straightforward to edit and delete one photo without affect-
ing any of the other digital content stored on the camera.
Intuitively, people’s conscious experiences cannot easily
be broken down in this way. It would be far more difficult
for a neurosurgeon to operate on somebody’s brain and alter
their memory of a stimulus. Rather than being encoded in a
discrete, localised region of the brain, as per the camera, a
person’s sensory experience is integrated with a vast number
of memories, causing widespread changes across all areas of
the brain. Inside a digital camera the encoded information
lies isolated, detached and dormant. In somebody’s brain the
same information alters every aspect of how they think, act
and process subsequent information.
Tononi’s (2008) idea of binding through information inte-
gration is closely aligned with the idea of binding through
data compression. Indeed, Maguire et al. (2014) have shown
that, for information lossless processes, Tononi’s quantifica-
tion of integration is equivalent to data compression. Con-
sider, for example, the case of an uncompressed string of
data. Here, every bit carries independent information about
the string. In contrast, when the same file is compressed to the
limit, each bit in the final representation is fully dependent on
every other bit for its significance. No bit carries independent
information about the original text file. Damaging the first
bit of an uncompressed file leaves you with a 50% chance of
getting the first bit right and 100% chance of getting the rest
of the bits right. Each bit holds independent significance. For
a compressed file, damaging the first bit corrupts everything
and leaves you with only a 50% chance of getting all the bits
right and a 50% chance of getting them all wrong. The sig-
nificance of the first bit has been totally integrated with all of
the other bits through the process of data compression.
If data is optimally compressed then it becomes extremely
difficult to edit in its compressed state. For example, imagine
a compressed encoding of a Wikipedia page. You want to edit
the first word on the page. But where is this word encoded in
the compressed file? There is no easily delineated set of bits
which corresponds to the first word and nothing else. Instead,
the whole set of data has been integrated, with every bit from
the original file depending on all the others. To discern the
impact that the first word has had on the compressed encod-
ing you have to understand the compression scheme. There
are no shortcuts. Accordingly, Maguire et al. (2014) have
developed a formulation of a memory’s ‘edit distance’ as a
reliable measure of its integration.
We propose that this unavoidable difficulty of breaking
down people’s behaviour into a set of discrete, independent
components is precisely what people mean when they apply
the term ‘conscious’. From this integration or ‘compression-
ist’ perspective consciousness is not a tangible property, but
rather a heuristic that people adopt in modelling the behaviour
of a system. Specifically, we attribute consciousness to a sys-
tem when the data compression it carries out is so sophisti-
cated that we are forced to model it as unitary. In the case
of the brain, its extraordinary capacity for compressing infor-
mation leads us to attribute consciousness to the behaviour
produced.
Dennett’s Multiple Drafts Model
While compressionist theories of consciousness emphasise
integration as the defining feature of consciousness (e.g.
Tononi, 2008), Dennett (1991) provides a theory which fo-
cuses specifically on the disintegrated nature of conscious-
ness. Similar to the compressionist perspective, his multiple
drafts model views the mind in terms of information process-
ing, and consciousness as an explanative model for behaviour.
However, instead of relying on information theory to resolve
the combination problem, he proposes that there actually is
no problem, because there is no strong combination. He criti-
cises the idea of what he calls the “Cartesian theatre”, a point
where all of the information processing in the brain is inte-
grated. Instead, Dennett (1991) presents consciousness as a
succession of multiple drafts, a process in flux without central
organisation.
Intuitively, consciousness does not appear ‘drafty’ (i.e.
easily decomposable into disjoint, unintegrated components).
While physical objects are clearly drafty, being reducible into
discrete atoms, the standout feature of conscious systems is
how undrafty they are. According to the compressionist per-
spective, it is the undraftiness of a system’s information pro-
cessing we have in mind when we describe it as being ‘con-
scious’. Although Dennett (1991) provides examples where
consciousness seems to be less strictly integrated (e.g. the
phi phenomenon, the cutaneous rabbit illusion), what is strik-
ing about these examples is how few and far between they
are. We simply don’t notice disintegration effects in every-
day life. For this reason, the burden of explanation on theo-
ries of consciousness should be to explain how such a level
of extreme undraftiness (i.e. integration) is achieved by the
brain. Dennett’s (1991) efforts to illustrate that conscious-
ness is somewhat drafty fail to tackle the burning question of
how and why people’s behaviour appears so consistently and
convincingly unitary. The advantage of compressionism is
that it can offer a computational account for how such strong
information binding can occur, without needing to invoke any
special non-physical properties.
In the following sections we demonstrate the potential of
compressionism as a theory of mind by detailing how it can
account for other mysterious features of consciousness, such
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as qualia and self-awareness.
Addressing the Hard Problem of Consciousness
It seems possible to conceive of an artificial compressor
which compresses large amounts of current and historical
data in parallel, though without experiencing the same form
of awareness that humans are familiar with. For example,
critics of compressionism might question whether off-the-
shelf image or video compressors understand the images they
are compressing. We argue that compression carried out by
the brain is likely to have two additional ingredients which set
it apart from simpler compression systems by supporting self-
awareness: first, it is embodied, and second, it compresses
observations of its own behaviour.
Compression enables the binding of information that is dis-
tributed in both time and space. The embodied approach
in cognitive science emphasises the vital role an organism’s
body plays in determining how and what it thinks. According
to Clark (1999): “It is increasingly clear that, in a wide variety
of cases, the individual brain should not be the sole locus of
cognitive scientific interest. Cognition is not a phenomenon
that can be successfully studied while marginalizing the roles
of body, world and action”. A computer program that com-
presses files on a computer lacks the embodiment that would
provide it with a situated perspective on the world. It has no
means of engaging physically with its environment, hence its
compression does not instantiate the singular embodied agent
we associate with consciousness.
The second ingredient concerns the social aspect of con-
sciousness. According to Dunbar and Shultz (2007), intelli-
gence was selected for, not by the need for technical compe-
tence, but by the computational demands of living in large,
complex societies. When we watch other individuals, we re-
alise that there is a great deal of redundancy in their activ-
ity. Rather than simply cataloguing and memorising every
action they perform, we can instead posit the more succinct
hypothesis of a concise ‘self’ which motivates these actions.
By maintaining this theory of selfhood we can compress the
behaviour of others and thus make accurate predictions as
to how they will behave in different contexts. But the be-
haviour of other humans also has another component, namely
that they react to you, the observer. In order to best predict
and manipulate the behaviour of others, it pays to maintain a
model of one’s own self, a process which is achieved by com-
pressing our own observations of past behaviour (see Friston
& Frith, 2015).
We propose that this ‘understanding of the self’ is a re-
quirement for the accurate modelling of the behaviour of oth-
ers. If an individual lived in complete isolation within a sim-
ple environment, there would be no motivation for maintain-
ing a complex model of a self that has experiences. It is
only when people are embedded in a complex social envi-
ronment that the goal of interacting with others requires them
to maintain a detailed model of their own actions. When you
observe others, they observe you observing them observing
you. This recursive modelling, achieved through data com-
pression, gives rise to a rich understanding of selfhood, an
understanding of what it feels like to be conscious.
This recursive self-modelling may also explain another as-
pect of consciousness that seems to evade logical explanation,
namely its subjective flavour, or qualia. Some examples of
qualia include the pain of a toothache, the taste of sweetness
or the perceived redness of an apple. These kinds of experi-
ences seem to defy objective, reducible description.
Dennett (1991) points out that even the most subjective
of qualia are closely intertwined with the concept of self-
modelling. He argues that an observer’s perception of an ex-
perience is nothing other than an understanding of how the
observer is affected by that experience: there is nothing left
over that could be considered the essence of a quale. For ex-
ample, your personal experience of the colour red is nothing
greater than an understanding of the implications of encoun-
tering a red stimulus, a model which you maintain to assist in
compressing the behaviour of others. According to this view,
all subjective feelings are, at their root, based on the identifi-
cation of patterns which connect and unite events distributed
in space and time.
We propose that the unique flavour of consciousness results
from individual differences in how stimuli are compressed.
Conscious perception is not a passive process whereby in-
coming sensory information is simply recorded in its raw for-
mat. Instead, people gaze through the lens of understand-
ing provided by data compression. Different people, with
different memories, will extract different patterns in a given
stimulus, leading to different subjective experiences. In par-
ticular, people will have an intimate personal understanding
of how they themselves experience or ‘compress’ a stimulus,
one which remains beyond the remit of objective science.
Philosophical Zombies
Chalmers (1995) has previously identified a distinction be-
tween what he views as the ‘easy’ problems of conscious-
ness (e.g. explaining object discrimination) and the much
harder problem of explaining why subjective feelings accom-
pany cognitive information processing. He explores the idea
of an ‘explanatory gap’ between the objective and subjective,
arguing that physical explanations cannot account for mental
experience. He maintains that mental states are ontologically
distinct from and are not reducible to physical, computable
systems.
In support of this position, Chalmers entertains the possi-
bility of philosophical zombies, entities which act just like a
conscious individual, but which lack qualitative experience.
He argues that because such zombies seem conceivable, they
must be logically possible, hence raising questions about the
soundness of physicalism. Compressionism, on the other
hand, takes the opposite view, seeking to bridge the explana-
tory gap. If consciousness is equivalent to data compression
then any two systems which carry out the same compression
should be viewed as equally conscious.
Chalmers’ (1995) acceptance of philosophical zombies
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paves the way for a double-aspect theory of information, lead-
ing him to speculate on the possibility of alien ‘psychophys-
ical laws’ that govern qualia, supporting widespread ‘pan-
protopsychic’ consciousness across the universe. Compres-
sionism, in contrast, offers a more parsimonious account of
the link between consciousness and the physical world, re-
lying on computational complexity rather than supernatural
phenomena. By explaining how straight-forward information
processing can bind information and lead to subjective, self-
aware experiences, it might seem that compressionism can
dissolve the hard problem.
Nevertheless, proponents of compressionism should not be
so quick to dismiss Chalmers’ views. For a start, optimal data
compression is not computable (see Chaitin, 2006). What
this means in practice is that the problem of consciousness
is guaranteed to remain hard: there is no computable sce-
nario that would allow it to be resolved. Indeed, given this
intrinsic intractability, Maguire et al. (2014) have shown that
there is no potential of a breakthrough theory in neuroscience
which would explain how the brain carries out its compres-
sion. Thus, what compressionism offers is not the solution to
the puzzle of consciousness, but merely a framework which
can serve to point us in the right direction. To be clear, iden-
tifying a structural parallel between information processing
and phenomenal experience does not eliminate the mysteri-
ousness of that experience. It simply allows us to express the
problem in a more systematic fashion, potentially supporting
further insight.
Conclusion
Converging sources of evidence suggest a fundamental ex-
planatory role for data compression in the evolved function of
the brain. We have explored some of this research and sought
to connect it together by proposing the term ‘compression-
ism’. The concept of data compression is already pervasive
in the history of psychology and cognitive science. From neu-
ral networks, to classical ACT-R and SOAR architectures, to
Bayesian predictive models, information is processed in ways
that end up compressing events spread out over space and
time. Thus, what compressionism offers is not a radically new
idea but rather a framework for reconciling these varied ap-
proaches, one which opens up the use of powerful mathemat-
ical tools developed in AIT by Solomonoff, Chaitin, Hutter
and others. Although it cannot and does not seek to eliminate
the hard problem, compressionism can serve to put a name
and structure to that hardness.
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